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Abstract
The ever-growing advances of deep learning in
many areas including vision, recommendation sys-
tems, natural language processing, etc., have led
to the adoption of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
in production systems. The availability of large
datasets and high computational power are the
main contributors to these advances. The datasets
are usually crowdsourced and may contain
sensitive information. This poses serious privacy
concerns as this data can be misused or leaked
through various vulnerabilities. Even if the cloud
provider and the communication link is trusted,
there are still threats of inference attacks where an
attacker could speculate properties of the data used
for training, or find the underlying model archi-
tecture and parameters. In this survey, we review
the privacy concerns brought by deep learning,
and the mitigating techniques introduced to tackle
these issues. We also show that there is a gap in
the literature regarding test-time inference privacy,
and propose possible future research directions.
1. Introduction
The success of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in various
fields including vision, medicine, recommendation systems,
natural language processing, etc., has resulted in their deploy-
ment in numerous production systems [1, 2]. In the world of
medicine, learning is used to find patterns in patient histories
and to recognize abnormalities in medical imaging which
help with disease diagnosis and prognosis. The use of ma-
chine learning in healthcare can compromise patient privacy,
for instance by exposing the patient’s genetic markers, as
shown by Fredrikson et al. [3]. Deep learning is also widely
used in finance for predicting prices or creating portfolios,
among many other applications. In these cases, usually, an
entity trains its own model and the model parameters are con-
sidered confidential. Being able to find or infer them is consid-
ered a breach of privacy [4]. Ease of access to large datasets
and high computational power (GPUs and TPUs) have paved
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the way for the aforementioned advances. These datasets are
usually crowdsourced and might contain sensitive informa-
tion. This poses serious privacy concerns, as neural networks
are used in different aspects of our lives [5, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10].
Figure 1 shows a classification of possible threats to deep
learning. One threat is the direct intentional or unintentional
exposure of sensitive information, through untrusted data
curator, communication link, or cloud [11, 12]. This
information can be the training data, inference queries or
model parameters or hyperparameters. If we assume that
information cannot be attained directly, there is still the
threat of information exposure through inference, indirectly.
Membership inference attacks [13] can infer whether a
given data instance was part of the training process of a
model. Model inversion and attribute inference attacks can
infer sensitive features about a data instance, from observed
predictions of a trained model, and other non-sensitive
features of that data instance [14, 15]. Some attacks are
targeted towards stealing information about a deployed
model, such as its architecture [16], trained parameters [17]
or a general property of the data it was trained on, for instance,
if the images used for training were all taken outdoor [18].
There is a myriad of methods proposed to tackle these threats.
The majority of these methods focus on the data aggrega-
tion/dataset publishing and training stages of deep learning.
We classify these methods into three classes. The first class of
methods focuses on sanitizing the data and trying to remove
sensitive information from it while maintaining the statistical
trends [19, 20]. The second class focuses on making the
DNN training phase private and protecting the data used for
training [21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. The last class, of which there
is only a handful of works, attempts to protect the privacy
of the test-time inference phase by protecting the input data
(request) that the user sends to a deployed DNN [27, 28, 29].
In this paper, we first briefly discuss existing attacks and
privacy threats against deep learning. Then, we focus on
the existing privacy-preserving methods for deep learning
and demonstrate that there is a gap in the literature regarding
test-time inference privacy.
2. Existing Threats
In this section, we map the space of existing threats
against privacy in deep learning and machine learning in
general. While the focus of this survey is privacy-preserving
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Figure 1. Categorization of existing threats against deep learning
techniques, we provide a brief summary of attacks to better
situate the need for privacy protection. Figure 1 shows the
landscape of these threats, which we have divided into two
main categories of direct and indirect information exposure
hazards. Direct threats are those where the attacker can gain
access to the actual information. In indirect attacks, however,
the attacker tries to infer or guess the information and does
not have access to the actual information.
2.1. Direct Information Exposure
Direct intentional or unintentional data breaches can occur
in many different settings and are not limited to machine
learning. Dataset breaches through data curators or entities
housing the data can be caused unintentionally by hackers,
malware, virus, or social engineering, by tricking individuals
into handing over sensitive data to adversaries [11]. A
study by Intel Security [30] demonstrated that employees
are responsible for 43% of data leakage, half of which is
believed to be unintentional. A malicious party can exploit
a system’s backdoor to bypass a server’s authentication
mechanism and gain direct access to sensitive datasets, or
sensitive parameters and models [31, 32, 33]. The recent
hacking of Equifax, for instance, exploited a vulnerability in
the Apache Struts software, which was used by Equifax [31].
Data sharing by transmitting confidential data without
proper encryption is an example of data exposure through
communication link [34]. Kaspersky Labs reported in 2018
that they found four million Android apps that were sending
unencrypted user profile data to advertisers’ servers [35].
Private data can also be exposed through the cloud service
that receives it to run a process on it, for instance, Machine
Learning as a Service (MLaaS). Some of these services
do not clarify what happens to the data once the process is
finished, nor do they even mention that they are sending the
user’s data to the cloud, and not processing it locally [6].
2.2. Indirect (Inferred) Information Exposure
As shown in figure 1, we categorize indirect attacks into
5 main groups of membership inference, model inversion,
hyperparameter inference, parameter inference, and property
inference attacks. Table 1 shows a summary of different
attacks and their properties. The “Access to Model” column
determines whether the attack needs white-box or black-box
access to model to successfully mount. White-box access
assumes access to the full target model, whereas black-box
assumes only query access to the model, without knowledge
on the architecture or parameters of the target model. The
last column shows whether the attacker needs access to the
output confidence values of the model (the probabilities,
logits), or whether only the predicted labels suffice.
2.2.1. MEMBERSHIP INFERENCE
Given a data instance and (black-box or white-box) access
to a pre-trained target model, a membership inference
attack speculates whether or not the given data instance has
contributed to the training step of the target model. Shokri
et al. [13] propose the first membership inference attack
on machine learning where they consider an attacker who
has black-box query access to the target model and can
obtain confidence scores (probability vector) for the queried
input. The attacker uses this confidence score to deduce
the participation of given data in training. They first train
shadow models on a labeled dataset that can be generated
using three methods: model inversion attack (we will see
next), statistics-based synthesis (through assumptions about
the underlying distribution of training set), or noisy real
data. Using these shadow models, the attacker trains an
“attack model” that distinguishes the participation of a data
instance in the training set of the shadow models. Lastly,
for the main inference attack, the attacker makes queries to
the target deployed model to receive confidence scores for
each given input data instance and infers whether or not the
input was part of the target training data. This attack is built
on the assumption that if a record was used in the training
of a model, it would yield a higher confidence score, than
a record which was not seen before by the model.
Some studies [46, 47, 15] attribute membership inference
attacks to the generalization gap, the over-fitting of the model,
and data memorization capabilities of neural networks. Deep
neural networks have been shown to memorize the training
data [48, 49, 50], rather than learning the latent properties of
the data, which means they often tend to over-fit to the train-
ing data. Long et al. [36] propose an approach which more ac-
curately tests the membership of a given instance. They train
the shadow models with and without this given instance, and
then at inference time the attacker tests to see if the instance
was used for training the target model, similar to Shokri et
al.’s approach. More recently, Salem et al. [37] propose a
more generic attack that could relax the main requirements
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Table 1. Properties of some notable attacks against machine learning privacy. MIA denotes Model Inversion Attack in the table.
Attack
Membership
Inference
Model
Inversion
Hyperparam.
Inference
Parameter
Inference
Property
Inference
Access
to Model
Access to Model Output
Membership Inference [13]  # # # # Blackbox Logits
Measuring Membership Privacy[36]  # # # # Blackbox Logits
ML-Leaks[37]  # # # # Blackbox Logits
The Natural Auditor [38]  # # # # Blackbox Label
LOGAN [39]  # # # # Both Logits
Privacy Risk in ML [15]   # # # Whitebox Logits+Auxilary
Fredrikson et al. [3] #  # # # Blackbox Logits
MIA w/ Confidence Values [14] #  # # # Both Logits
Adversarial NN Inversion [40] #  # # # Blackbox Logits
Updates-Leak [41] #  # # # Blackbox Logits
Collaborative Inference MIA [42] #  # # # Both Logits
The Secret Sharer [43] # # # #  Blackbox Logits
Property Inference on FCNNs [18] # # # #  Whitebox Logits
Hacking Smart Machines w [44] # # # #  Whitebox Logits
Cache Telepathy [16] # # #  # Blackbox Logits
Stealing Hyperparameters [45] # # #  # Blackbox Logits
Stealing ML Models [17] # #   # Blackbox Label
Figure 2. The image on the left was recovered using the model
inversion attack of Fredrikson et al. [14]. The image on the right
shows an image from the training set. The attacker is given only
the person’s name and access to a facial recognition system that
returns a class confidence score [14].
in previous attacks (such as using multiple shadow models,
knowledge of the target model structure, and having a dataset
from the same distribution as the target model’s training data),
and show that such attacks are also applicable at a lower cost,
without significantly degrading their effectiveness.
Membership inference attacks do not always need access to
the confidence values (logits) of the target model, as shown
by Song & Shmatikov in a recent attack [38], which can
detect with very few queries to a model if a particular user’s
texts were used to train it.
Yeom et al [15] suggest a membership inference attack for
cases where the attacker can have white-box access to the
target model and know the average training loss of the model.
In this attack, for an input record, the attacker evaluates the
loss of the model and if the loss is smaller than a threshold
(the average loss on the training set), the input record is
deemed part of the training set. Membership inference
attacks can also be applied to Generative Adversarial
Networks (GANs), as shown by Hayes et al. [39].
2.2.2. MODEL INVERSION AND ATTRIBUTE INFERENCE
Model inversion and attribute inference attacks are against
attribute privacy, where an adversary tries to infer sensitive
attributes of given data instances from a released model
and the instance’s non-sensitive attributes [51]. The most
prominent of these attacks is against a publicly-released
linear regression model, where Fredrikson et al. [3] invert the
model of a medicine (Warfarin) dosage prediction task. They
recover genomic information about the patient, based on the
model output and several other non-sensitive attributes (e.g.,
height, age, weight). This attack can be applied with only
black-box API access to the target model. Fredrikson et al.
formalize this attack as maximizing the posterior probability
estimate of the sensitive attribute. In other words, the
attacker assumes that features f1 to fd−1, of the fd features
of each data instance are non-sensitive. the attacker then tries
to maximize the posterior probability of feature fd, given the
nonsensitive features of f1 to fd−1, and the model output.
In another work, given white-box access to a neural network,
Fredrikson et al. [14] show that they could extract instances
of training data, from observed model predictions. Figure 2
shows a recovered face image that is similar to the input
image and was reconstructed by utilizing the confidence
score of the target model. Yeom et al. [15] also propose
an attribute inference attack, built upon the same principle
used for their membership inference attack, mentioned in
Section 2.2.1. The attacker evaluates the model’s loss on the
input instance for different values of the sensitive attribute
and infers the value that yields a loss value similar to that
outputted by the original data, as the sensitive value. Salem et
al. [41] suggest a model inversion attack on online-learning,
using a generative adversarial network and based on the
difference between a model, before and after a gradient
update. More recently, He et al. [42] propose a new set of
attacks to compromise the privacy of test-time inference
queries, in collaborative deep learning systems where a DNN
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is split and distributed to different participants. This scheme
is called split learning [52], which is discussed in Section 4.
They demonstrate that with their attack, one malicious partic-
ipant can recover an arbitrary input fed into this system, even
with no access to other participants’ data or computations.
2.2.3. MODEL STEALING:
HYPERPARAMETER AND PARAMETER INFERENCE
Trained models are considered intellectual properties of
their owners and can be considered confidential in many
cases [4], therefore extracting the model can be considered a
privacy breach. Apart from this, as discussed earlier, DNNs
are shown to memorize information about their training
data, therefore exposing the model parameters could lead to
exposure of training data. A model stealing attack is meant
to recover the model parameters via black-box access to
the target model. Tramer et al. [17] devise an attack that
finds parameters of a model given the observation of its
predictions (confidence values). Their attack tries to find
parameters of the model through equation solving, based
on pairs of input-outputs. This attack cannot be mounted in
a setting where the confidence values are not provided.
Hyperparameter stealing attacks try to find the hyperparame-
ters used during the model training, such as the regularization
coefficient [45] or model architecture [16].
2.2.4. PROPERTY INFERENCE
This class of attacks tries to infer specific patterns of informa-
tion from the target model. An example of these attacks is the
memorization attack that aims to find sensitive patterns in the
training data of a target model [43]. These attacks have been
mounted on Hidden Markov Models (HMM) and Support
Vector Machines (SVM) [44] and neural networks [18].
3. Privacy-Preserving Mechanisms
In this section, we review the literature of privacy-preserving
mechanisms for deep learning and machine learning in gen-
eral. Figure 3 shows our classification of the landscape of this
field. We divide the literature into three main groups. The first
is private data aggregation methods, which aim at collecting
data and forming datasets, while preserving the privacy of the
contributors [19, 20]. The second group, which is comprised
of a large body of work focuses on devising mechanisms that
make the training process of models private so that sensi-
tive information about the participants of the training dataset
would not be exposed. Finally, the last group aims at the test-
time inference phase of deep learning. It tries to protect the
privacy of users of deployed models, who send their data to a
trained model for having a given inference service carried out.
3.1. Data Aggregation
Here, we introduce the most prominent data privacy-
preserving mechanisms. Not all these methods are applied
to deep learning, but we briefly discuss them for the sake of
comprehensiveness. These methods can be broadly divided
into two groups of context-free privacy and context-aware.
Context-free privacy solutions, such as differential privacy,
are unaware of the specific context or the purpose that
the data will be used for. Whereas context-aware privacy
solutions, such as information-theoretic privacy, are aware
of the context where the data is going to be used, and can
achieve an improved privacy-utility tradeoff [53].
3.1.1. NAIVE DATA ANONYMIZATION
What we mean by naive anonymization in this survey is
the removal of identifiers from data, such as the names,
addresses, and full postcodes of the participants, to protect
privacy. This method was used for protecting patients while
processing medical data and has been shown to fail on many
occasions [54, 19, 55]. Perhaps the most prominent failure is
the Netflix prize case, where Narayanan & Shmatikov apply
their de-anonymization technique to the Netflix Prize dataset.
This dataset contains anonymous movie ratings of 500,000
subscribers of Netflix. They showed that an adversary with
auxiliary knowledge (from the publicly available Internet
Movie Database records) about individual subscribers can
easily identify the user and uncover potentially sensitive
information [54].
3.1.2. K-ANONYMITY
A dataset has k-anonymity property if each participant’s
information cannot be distinguished from at least k − 1
other participants whose information is in the dataset [19].
K-anonymity means that for any given combination of
attributes that are available to the adversary (these attributes
are called quasi-identifiers), there are at least k rows with the
exact same set of attributes. K-anonymity has the objective
of impeding re-identification. However, k-anonymization
has been shown to perform poorly on the anonymization
of high-dimensional datasets [56]. This has led to privacy
notions such as l-diversity [57] and t-closeness [58], which
are out of the scope of this survey.
3.1.3. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
Definition 3.1. -Differential Privacy (-DP). For  ≥ 0,
an algorithmA satisfies -DP [59, 20] if and only if for any
pair of datasetsD andD′ that differ in only one element:
P[A(D)= t]≤eP[A(D′)= t] ∀t (1)
where, P[A(D) = t] denotes the probability that the algo-
rithm A outputs t. In this setup, the quantity ln P[A(D)=t]P[A(D′)=t]
is named the privacy loss. DP tries to approximate the effect
of an individual opting out of contributing to the dataset, by
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ensuring that any effect due to the inclusion of one’s data is
small. One of the widely used DP mechanisms when dealing
with numerical data is the Laplace mechanism.
Definition 3.2. Laplace Mechanism. [20] Given a target
function f and a fixed  ≥ 0, the randomizing algorithm
Af (D) = f(D) + x where x is a perturbation random
variable drawn from a Laplace distribution Lap(µ, ∆f ),
is called the Laplace Mechanism and is -DP. Here, ∆f
is the global sensitivity of function f , and is defined as
∆f = sup|f(D)−f(D′)| over all the dataset pairs (D,D′)
that differ in only one element. Finding this sensitivity is not
always trivial, specifically if the function f is a deep neural
network, or even a number of layers of it [60].
Differential privacy satisfies a composition property that
states when two mechanisms with privacy budgets 1 and 2
are applied to the same datasets, together they use a privacy
budget of 1 + 2. As such, composing multiple differentially
private mechanisms consumes a linearly increasing privacy
budget. It has been shown that tighter privacy bound for com-
position can be reached, so that the privacy budget decreases
sub-linearly [61, 62]. There are multiple variants of the con-
ventional -differential privacy which have been proposed
to provide a tighter analysis of the privacy budget under com-
position. One of them is differential privacy with Advanced
Composition (AC) [63], which allows an additive leakage
probability parameter δ to the right-hand side of Equation 1.
Differential privacy can also be achieved without the need to
trust a centralized server by having each participant apply a
differentially private randomization to their data themselves,
before sharing it. This model is named the local model of
differential privacy, and the method “randomized response”
is shown to be locally differentially private [64]. Local
differential privacy has been deployed on many systems
for gathering statistics privately [65, 66]. For instance,
Google uses a technique named RAPPOR [65] to allow web
browser developers to privately collect usage statistics. A
large body of Differentially private mechanisms has been
proposed for various applications. Triastcyn & Faltings
present a technique that generates synthetic datasets that still
have statistical properties of the real data while providing
differential privacy guarantees with respect to this data [67].
A generalized version of differential privacy called Pufferfish
was proposed by [68]. The Pufferfish framework can be
used to create new privacy definitions tailored for specific
applications [69], such as Census data release.
3.1.4. SEMANTIC SECURITY AND ENCRYPTION
Semantic security [70] (computationally secure) is a standard
privacy requirement of encryption schemes which states that
the advantage (a measure of how successfully an adversary
can attack a cryptographic algorithm) of an adversary with
background information should be cryptographically small.
Semantic security is theoretically possible to break but it
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Figure 3. Categorization of privacy-preserving schemes for deep
learning.
is infeasible to do so by any known practical means [71].
Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC), which we discuss
in Section 3.2, is based on semantic security definition [72].
3.1.5. INFORMATION-THEORETIC PRIVACY
Information-theoretic privacy is a context-aware privacy
solution. Context-aware solutions explicitly model the
dataset statistics, unlike context-free solutions that assume
worst-case dataset statistics and adversaries. There is a body
of work studying information-theoretic based methods for
both privacy and fairness, where privacy and fairness are pro-
vided through information degradation, through obfuscation
or adversarial learning and demonstrated by mutual infor-
mation reduction [73, 74, 53, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82].
Huang et al. introduce a context-aware privacy framework
called generative adversarial privacy (GAP), which leverages
generative adversarial networks (GANs) to generate
privatized datasets. Their scheme comprises of a sanitizer
that tries to remove private attributes, and an adversary
that tries to infer them [53]. They show that the privacy
mechanisms learned from data (in a generative adversarial
fashion) match the theoretically optimal ones.
3.2. Training Phase
The literature surrounding private training of deep learning,
and machine learning can be categorized based on the
guarantee that these methods provide, which is most com-
monly either based on differential privacy (Section 3.1.3)
or semantic security and encryption (Section 3.1.4). Privacy
using encryption is achieved by doing computation over
encrypted data. The two most common methods for this
are Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and Secure Multi-Party
Computation (SMC).
Homomorphic Encryption (HE). HE [107] allows com-
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Table 2. Categorization of some notable privacy-preserving mechanisms for training. In the table, the following abbreviations have been
used: ERM for Empirical Risk Minimization, GM for Generative Model, AE for Auto Encoder, LIR for Linear Regression, LOR for
Logistic Regression, LM for Linear Means, FLD for Fisher’s Linear Discriminant, NB for Naive Bayes and RF for Random Forest.
Method DP SMC HE Dataset(s) Task
DPSGD [22]  # # MNIST, CIFAR-10 Image Classification w/ DNN
DP LSTM [83]  # # Reddit Posts Language Model w/ LSTMs
DP LOR [84]  # # Artificial Data Logistic Regression
DP ERM [85]  # # Adult, KDD-99 Classification w/ ERM
DP GAN [86]  # # MNIST, MIMIC-III Data Generation w/ GAN
DP GM [87]  # # MNIST, CDR, TRANSIT Data Generation w/ GM
DP AE [88]  # # Health Social Network Data Behaviour Prediction w/ AE
DP Belief Network[89]  # # YesiWell, MNIST Classification w/ DNN
Adaptive Laplace Mechanism[90]  # # MNIST, CIFAR-10 Image Classification w/ DNN
PATE [23]  # # MNIST, SVHN Image Classification w/ DNN
Scalable Learning w/ PATE [91]  # # MNIST, SVHN, Adult, Glyph Image Classification w/ DNN
DP Ensemble [24]  # # KDD-99, UCI-HAR, URLs Classification w/ ERM
SecProbe [92]  # # US, MNIST, SVHN Regress. & Class. w/ DNN
Distributed DP [93]  # # eICU, TCGA Classification w/ DNN
DP model publishing [94]  # # MNIST, CIFAR Image Classification w/ DNN
DP federated learning [95]  # # MNIST Image Classification w/ DNN
ScalarDP, PrivUnit [96]  # # MNIST, CIFAR Image Classification w/ DNN
DSSGD [21]  # # MNIST, SVHN Image Classification w/ DNN
Private Collaborative NN [97]   # MNIST Image Classification w/ DNN
Secure Aggregation for ML [98] #  # - Federated Learning
QUOTIENT [99] #  # MNIST, Thyroid, Credit Classification w/ DNN
SecureNN [100] #  # MNIST Image Classification w/ DNN
ABY3 [101] #  # MNIST LIR, LOR, NN
SecureML [102] #   MNIST, Gisette, Arcene LIR, LOR, NN
Deep Learning w/ AHE [103] # #  MNIST Image Classification w/ DNN
ML Confidential [104] # #  Wisconsin Breast Cancer LM, FLD
Encrypted Statistical ML [105] # #  20 datasets from UCI ML LOR, NB, RF
CryptoDL [25] # #  MNIST, CIFAR-10 Image Classification w/ DNN
DPHE [106] # #  Caltech101/256, CelebA Image Classification w/ SVM
putation over encrypted data. A client can send their data,
in an encrypted format, to a server and the server can
compute over this data without decrypting it, and then send
a ciphertext (encrypted result) to the client for decryption.
HE is extremely compute-intensive and is therefore not yet
deployed in many production systems [108, 109].
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC). SMC attempts
at designing a network of computing parties (not all of
which the user necessarily has to trust) that carry out a given
computation and makes sure no data leaks. Each party in
this network has access to only an encrypted part of the data.
SMC ensures that as long as the owner of the data trusts
at least one of the computing systems in the network, their
input data remain secret. Simple functions can easily be
computed using this scheme. Arbitrarily complex function
computations can also be supported, but with an often
prohibitive computational cost [109].
In this survey, we divided the literature of private training
into three groups of methods that employ: 1) Differential
Privacy (DP), 2) Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and 3)
Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMC). Table 2 shows this
categorization for the literature we discuss in this section.
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Figure 4. Overview of how a deep learning framework works and
how differential privacy can be applied to different parts of the
pipeline.
3.2.1. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
This section briefly discusses methods for modifying deep
learning algorithms to satisfy differential privacy. Figure 4
shows an overview of a deep learning framework. As can
be seen, the randomization required for differential privacy
(or the privacy-preserving noise) can be inserted in five
places: to the input, to the loss/objective function, to the
gradient updates, to the output (the optimized parameters
of the trained model) and to the labels [23].
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Input perturbations can be considered equivalent to using
a sanitized dataset (discussed in Section 3.1) for training.
objective function perturbation and output perturbation
are explored for machine learning tasks with convex objec-
tive functions. For instance in the case of logistic regression,
Chaudhuri et al. prove that objective perturbation requires
sampling noise in the scale of 2n , and output perturbation re-
quires sampling noise in the scale of 2nλ , wheren is the num-
ber of samples and λ is the regularization coefficient [85]. In
deep learning tasks, due to the non-convexity of the objective
function, calculating the sensitivity of the function (which
is needed to determine the intensity of the added noise) be-
comes non-trivial. One solution is replacing the non-convex
function with an approximate convex polynomial function
[88, 89, 90] and then using objective function perturbation.
This approximation limits the capabilities and the utility that
a conventional DNN would have. Given discussed limita-
tions, gradient perturbation is the approach that is widely
used for private training in deep learning. Applying pertur-
bations on the gradients requires the gradient norms to be
bounded, and since in deep learning tasks the gradient could
be unbounded, clipping is usually used to alleviate this issue.
Shokri et al. showed that deep neural networks can be trained
in a distributed manner and with perturbed parameters to
achieve privacy [21], but their implementation requires  pro-
portional to the size of the target model, which can be in the
order of couple millions. Abadi et al. [22] propose a mecha-
nism dubbed the “moments accountant (MA)”, for bounding
the cumulative privacy budget of sequentially applied differ-
entially private algorithms, over deep neural networks. The
moments accountant uses the moment generating function of
the privacy loss random variable to keep track of a bound on
the privacy loss during composition. MA operates in three
steps: first, it calculates the moment generating functions
for the algorithms A1, A2,.., which are the randomizing
algorithms. It then composes the moments together through
a composition theorem, and finally, finds the best leakage
parameter (δ) for a given privacy budget of . The moments
accountant is widely used in different DP mechanisms for
private deep learning. Papernot et al. use MA to aid bounding
the privacy budget for their teacher ensemble method that
uses noisy voting and label perturbation [23, 91]. MA is
also employed by the works [93, 94, 95, 86, 87, 96] all of
which use perturbed gradients.
3.2.2. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
There are only a handful of works that exploit solely
homomorphic encryption for private training of machine
learning models [104, 105, 25]. Graepel et al. use a
Somewhat HE (SHE) scheme to train Linear Means (LM)
and Fisher’s Linear Discriminate (FLD) classifiers [104]. HE
algorithms have some limitations in terms of the functions
they can compute (for instance they cannot implement
non-linearities). For that reason, Graepel et al. propose
division-free algorithms and focus on simple classifiers and
not complex algorithms such as neural networks.
Hesamifard et al. [25] try to exploit HE for deep learning
tasks. They introduce methods for approximating the most
commonly used neural network activation functions (ReLU,
Sigmoid, and Tanh) with low degree polynomials. This is a
crucial step for designing efficient homomorphic encryption
schemes. They then train convolutional neural networks
with those approximate polynomial functions and finally,
implement convolutional neural networks over encrypted
data and measure the performance of the models.
3.2.3. SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION (SMC)
A trend in research on private and secure computation
consists of designing custom protocols for applications such
as linear and logistic regression [102] and neural network
training and inference [102, 99, 110]. These methods usually
target settings where different datasets from different places
are set to train a model together, or where computation is
off-loaded to a group of computing servers that do not collude
with each other. SMC requires that all participants be online
at all times, which requires a significant amount of communi-
cation [111]. Mohassel & Zhang proposed SecureML which
is a privacy-preserving stochastic gradient descent-based
method to privately train machine learning algorithms such
as linear regression, logistic regression and neural networks
in multiparty computation settings. SecureML uses secret
sharing to achieve privacy during training. In a more recent
work [101], Mohassel et al design protocols for secure
three-party training of DNNs with a majority of honest
parties. Agrawal et al. propose QUOTIENT [99] where
their goal is to design an optimization algorithm alongside
a secure computation protocol customized for it, instead of
a conventional approach which is using encryption on top
of existing optimization algorithms.
3.3. Inference Phase
As shown in Table 3 there are fewer works in the field of infer-
ence privacy, compared to training. Inference privacy targets
systems that are deployed to offer Inference-as-a-Service. In
these cases, the deployed system is assumed to be trained and
is not to learn anything new from the data provided by the
user. It is only supposed to carry out its designated inference
task. The categorization of literature for inference privacy is
similar to training, except that there is one extra group here,
named Information-Theoretic (IT) privacy. The works in
this group usually offer information-theoretic mathematical
or empirical evidence of how their methods operate and help
privacy. These works are based on the context-aware privacy
definition of Section 3.1.5, and they aim at decreasing the
information content in the data sent to the service provider
for inference so that there is only as much information in the
input as needed for the service and not more.
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Table 3. Categorization of some notable privacy-preserving mechanisms for inference. In this table, NB is short for Naive Bayes, and DT
is short for Decision Tree.
Method DP SMCHE IT Dataset(s) Task
ARDEN [112]  # # # MNIST, CIFAR-10, SVHN Image Classification w/ DNN
Cloak [113]  # #  CIFAR-100, CelebA, UTKFace Image Classification w/ DNN
Cryptonets [114] # #  # MNIST Image Classification w/ DNN
Private Classification [115] # #  # MNIST Image Classification w/ DNN
TAPAS [116] # #  # MNIST, Faces, Cancer, Diabetes Image Classification w/ DNN
FHE–DiNN [117] # #  # MNIST Image Classification w/ DNN
Face Match [118] # #  # LFW, IJB-A, IJB-B, CASIA Face recognition with CNNs
EPIC [109] #  # # CIFAR-10, MIT, Caltech Image Classification w/ DNN
DeepSecure [119] #  # # MNIST, UCI-HAR Classification w/ DNN
XONN [108] #  # # MNIST, CIFAR-10 Image Classification w/ DNN
Chameleon [120] #  # # MNIST, Credit Approval Classification w/ DNN and SVM
Classification over Encrypted Data[121] #   # Wisconsin Breast Cancer Classification w/ NB, DT
MiniONN [122] #   # MNIST, CIFAR-10 Image Classification w/ DNN
GAZELLE [123] #   # MNIST, CIFAR-10 Image Classification w/ DNN
DELPHI [124] #   # CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 Image Classification w/ DNN
Shredder [29] # # #  SVHN, VGG-Face, ImageNet Classification w/ DNN
DPFE [27] # # #  CelebA Image Classification w/ DNN
One notable difference between training and inference
privacy is the difference in the amount of literature on
different categories. There seems to be a trend of using
differential privacy for training, and encryption methods
(HE and SMC) for inference. One underlying reason
could be computational complexity and implementation.
Encryption methods, specifically homomorphic encryption,
are shown to be at least two orders of magnitude slower
than conventional execution [123]. That’s why adopting
them for training will increase training time significantly.
Also, as mentioned in Section 3.2.2, due to approximating
non-linear functions, the capabilities of neural networks in
terms of performance become limited during training on
encrypted data. For inference, however, adopting encryption
is more trivial, since the model is already trained. Employing
differential privacy, and noise addition, however, is less
trivial for inference, since it could damage the accuracy of
the trained model, if not done meticulously. Below we delve
deeper into the literature of each category.
3.3.1. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
There are very few works using differential privacy for in-
ference. The main reason is that differential privacy offers
a worst-case guarantee which requires high-intensity noise
(noise with high standard deviation) to be applied to all the
segments of the input. This inherently causes performance
degradation on pre-trained networks. Wang et al. [112] pro-
pose Arden, a data nullification and differentially private
noise injection mechanism for inference. Arden partitions the
DNN across edge device and the cloud. A simple data trans-
formation is performed on the mobile device, while the com-
putation heavy and complex inference relies on the cloud data
center. Arden uses data nullification, and noise injection to
make different queries indistinguishable so that the privacy of
the clients is preserved. The proposed scheme requires noisy
retraining of the entire network, with noise injected at differ-
ent layers. Since it is complicated to calculate the global sensi-
tivity at each layer of the neural network, the input to the noise
injection layer is clipped to the largest possible value created
by a member of the training set, on the trained network.
Mireshghallah et al. propose a non-intrusive approach
dubbed Cloak, in which there is no need to change/retrain
the network parameters, nor partition it. In short, Cloak
suggests a principled approach to learning Laplace noise
distributions that when added to the input, create perturbed
representations. These representations obfuscate the sensi-
tive information in the input while attempting to keep the
nonsensitive information intact, to be used for the inference
task at hand. An example of representations produced by
Cloak, for a smile detection task can be seen in Figure 5. In
other words, Cloak combines the context-aware privacy of
information-theoretic methods, with context-free differential
privacy to detect and lose excessive information in the inputs,
while providing a worst-case bound on the additive noise.
3.3.2. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
CryptoNets is one of the first works in HE inference [114].
Dowlin et al. present a method for converting a trained
neural network into an encrypted one, named a CryptoNet.
This allows the clients of an inference service to send their
data in an encrypted format and receive the result, without
their data being decrypted. CryptoNets allows the use of
SIMD (Single Instruction Multiple Data) operations, which
increase the throughput of the deployed system. However,
for single queries, the latency of this scheme is still high.
Chabanne et al. [115] approximate the ReLu non-linear acti-
vation function using low-degree polynomials and provide a
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Figure 5. Visualizing the effect of Cloak on the input images as we increase the average scale of perturbations B¯ that is proportional to
the standard deviation. The non-sensitive classification task is smile detection. The first row shows the heat map of perturbation scales
for each pixel. At higher scales, Cloak obfuscates the features that are non-conducive to the smile detection task e.g. the background,
the hair, etc., while only the lips and some minor facial attributes are recognizable.
normalization layer before the activation function, which of-
fers high accuracy. However, they do not show results on the
latency of their method. More recently, Juvekar et al. propose
GAZELLE [123], a system with lower latency (compared to
prior work) for secure and private neural network inference.
GAZELLE combines homomorphic encryption with tradi-
tional two-party computation techniques (such as garbled
circuits). With the help of its homomorphic linear algebra
kernels, which map neural network operations to optimized
homomorphic matrix-vector multiplication and convolutions,
GAZELLE is shown to be three orders of magnitude faster
than CryptoNets. Sanyal et al. leverage binarized neural
networks to speed-up their HE inference method. They claim
that unlike CryptoNets which only protects the data, their
proposed scheme can protect the privacy of the model as well.
3.3.3. SECURE MULTI-PARTY COMPUTATION (SMC)
Liu et al. propose MiniONN [122], which uses additively
homomorphic encryption (AHE) in a preprocessing step,
unlike GAZELLE which uses AHE to speed up linear
algebra directly. MiniONN demonstrates a significant
performance improvement compared to CryptoNets, without
loss of accuracy. However, it is only a two-party computation
scheme and does not support computation over multiple
parties. Riazi et al. introduce Chameleon, a two-party
computation framework whose vector dot product of signed
fixed-point numbers improves the efficiency of prediction
in classification methods based upon heavy matrix multipli-
cations. Chameleon achieves a 4.2× latency improvement
over MiniONN. Most of the efforts in the field of SMC for
deep learning are focused on speeding up the computation,
as demonstrated above, and also by [108], [109], [119].
The accuracy loss of the aforementioned methods, compared
to their pre-trained models is negligible (less than 1%).
3.3.4. INFORMATION THEORETIC PRIVACY
Privacy-preserving schemes that rely on information-
theoretic approaches usually assume a non-sensitive task,
the task that the service is supposed to execute and try to
degrade any excessive information in the input data that is
not needed for the main inference task. Osia et al. propose
Deep Private Feature Extraction (DPFE) [27] which aims at
obfuscating input images to hinder the classification of given
sensitive (private) labels, by modifying the network topology
and re-training all the model parameters. DPFE partitions
the network in two partitions, first partition to be deployed
on the edge and the second on the cloud. It also modifies the
network architecture by adding an auto-encoder in the middle
and then re-training the entire network with its loss function.
The encoder part of the auto-encoder is deployed on the edge
device, and the decoder is deployed on the server. The auto-
encoder aims to reduce the dimensions of the sent data which
decreases the communication cost, alongside decreasing the
amount of information that is sent, which helps the privacy.
DPFE’s loss function can be seen in Equation 2. It is
composed of three terms, first, the cross-entropy loss for a
classification problem consisting of M classes (yo,c indicates
whether the observation o belongs to class c and po,c is
the probability given by the network for the observation to
Privacy in Deep Learning: A Survey
belong to class c). This term aims at maintaining accuracy.
Second, a term that tries to decrease the distance between
intermediate activations of inputs with different private
labels, and a final term which tries to increase the distance
between intermediate activations of inputs with the same
private label. γ is a constant which depends on the number of
dimensions and the training data, it is used as a normalization
factor. k is also a constant which depends on the training data.
i and j are iterators over the main batch and a random batch,
respectively and Y is the private label for that batch member.
−
M∑
c=1
yo,clog(po,c)+γ(
∑
(i,j):Yi 6=Yj
||a′i−a′j ||2
+
∑
(i,j):Yi=Yj
(k−||a′i−a′j ||2))
(2)
DPFE retrains the given neural network and the auto-encoder
with this loss function. The training can be seen as an attempt
to create clustered representations of data, where the inputs
with the same private labels go in different clusters, and
inputs with different labels are pushed to the same cluster,
to mislead any adversary who tries to infer the private labels.
Given its loss function, DPFE cannot operate without the
private labels. Therefore, if there is a setting in which no
sensitive labels are provided, DPFE cannot be used. After
training, for each inference request, a randomly generated
noise is added to the intermediate results on the fly. This
noise is not there to achieve differential privacy.
More recently, Mireshghallah et al. suggested Shredder [29],
a framework that without altering the topology or the weights
of a pre-trained network, heuristically learns additive
noise distributions that reduce the information content of
communicated data while incurring minimal loss to the
inference accuracy. Shredder’s approach also consists of
cutting the neural network and executing a part of it on the
edge device, similar to DPFE. This approach has been shown
to decrease the overall execution time in some cases [29],
compared to running the entire neural network on the cloud,
since the communication takes the bulk of time and sensing
intermediate representations can sometimes save on the
communication since there are fewer dimensions.
Shredder initializes a noise tensor, with the same dimension
as the intermediate activation, by sampling from a Laplace
distribution with location of 0, and scale of b, which is a
hyperparameter. Then, using the loss function shown in
Equation 3, it tries to maintain the accuracy of the model (first
term), while increasing the amount of additive noise (second
term). λ is a knob that provides an accuracy-privacy trade-off.
−
M∑
c=1
yo,clog(po,c)−λ
N∑
i=1
|ni| (3)
Once the training is terminated, a Laplace distribution is fit
to the trained tensor, and the parameters of that distribution,
Figure 6. The workflow of federated learning model [111].
alongside the order of the elements, are saved. A collection
of these distributions are gathered. During inference, noise is
sampled from one of the saved distributions and re-ordered to
match the saved order. This noise tensor is then added to the
intermediate representation, before being sent to the cloud.
Both DPFE and Shredder empirically demonstrate a
reduction in the number of mutual information bits between
the original data and the sent intermediate representation.
DPFE can only be effective if the user knows what s/he
wants to protect against, whereas Shredder offers a more
general approach that tries to obliterate any information
that is irrelevant to the primary task. Empirical evaluations
showed that Shredder can in average loose more mutual
information, compared to DPFE. However, in the task of
inferring private labels, DPFE performs slightly better by
causing a higher misclassification rate for the adversary
since it has access to the private labels during training time.
4. Privacy-Enhancing
Execution Models and Environments
Apart from privacy-preserving schemes which are methods
that directly optimize for a given definition of privacy, there
are given execution models and environments that help en-
hance privacy and are not by themselves privacy-preserving.
In this section, we will briefly discuss federated learning,
split learning and trusted execution environments, which
have been used to enhance privacy. These methods are
usually accompanied by privacy-preserving schemes from
the previous section.
4.1. Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) is a machine learning setting
where many clients collaboratively train a model under the
administration of a central server while keeping the training
data local. Federated learning is built on the principles of
focused collection and data minimization which can alleviate
the privacy risks of centralized machine learning [111].
The workflow of federated learning can be seen in Figure 6.
This workflow is broken into six stages [111]:
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1. Problem identification: The problem that is to be solved
using federated learning should first be defined.
2. Client instrumentation: The clients can be instructed
to save the data needed for training. For example, the
applications running on the edge devices might need to
locally save some metadata (e.g. user interaction data)
alongside the main data (for instance text messages).
3. Simulation prototyping (optional): The engineer who is
deploying the system might need to prototype different
architectures and try different hyperparameters in a
federated learning simulation.
4. Federated model training: Multiple federated training
tasks are initiated which train different variations of the
model or use different optimization hyperparameters.
5. Model evaluation: When the tasks are done with the
training phase (usually after a few days), the models are
analyzed and evaluated, either on standard centralized
datasets or on local client data.
6. Deployment: When the analysis is finished and a model
is selected, the launch process is initiated. This process
consists of live A/B testing, manual quality assurance,
and a staged roll-out.
Federated learning is being widely used with SMC and differ-
ential Privacy [111, 98, 125].Bonawitz et al. apply Secure ag-
gregation to privately combine the outputs of local machine
learning on user devices in the federated learning setup, to up-
date a global model. Secure aggregation refers to the compu-
tation of a sum in a multiparty setting, where no party reveals
its update in the clear, even to the aggregator. When Secure
Aggregation is added to Federated Learning, the aggregation
of model updates is performed by a virtual incorruptible third
party induced by secure multiparty communication. With this
setup, the cloud provider learns only the aggregated model
update. There are also bodies of work that consider shuffling
of user data, so as to hide the origin of each data item.The
works of Cheu et al., and Balle et al. have proposed secure
aggregation protocols that satisfy differential privacy guaran-
tees in the shuffle model [126, 127]. More recent work [128]
mitigates the incurred error and communication overheads
in shuffle model. More in-depth details of federated learning
workflow and integration is out of the scope of this survey.
4.2. Split Learning
Split-learning is an execution model where the neural
network is split, between the client and the server [52]. This
is very similar to the neural network partitioning described
in Shredder [29] and DPFE [27]. Vanilla split learning is
formed by each client computing the forward pass through
a deep neural network up to a specific layer, called the cut
layer. The outputs of the cut layer, referred to as smashed
(a) Vanilla split learning (b) Boomerang split learning
Figure 7. The vanilla configuration of split learning where raw data
is not shared between client and server, and boomerang (U-shaped)
configuration where neither raw data nor the labels are shared
between client and server [129].
data, are sent from the edge device to another entity (either
the server or another client), which completes the rest of
the computation. With this execution scheme, a round of
forward pass is computed without sharing raw data. The
gradients can then be backpropagated from the server to
the cut layer in a similar fashion. The gradients at the cut
layer are transferred back to the clients, where the rest of the
backpropagation is completed. In this fashion, the training or
inference is done without having clients directly access each
other’s raw data. An instantiation of this setup where labels
are also not shared along with raw data is shown in Figure 7.
4.3. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
Trusted execution environments, also referred to as
secure enclaves, provide opportunities to move parts of
decentralized learning or inference processes into a trusted
environment in the cloud, whose code can be attested and
verified. Recently, Mo et al. have suggested a framework that
uses an edge device’s Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)
in conjunction with model partitioning to limit the attack
surface against DNNs [130]. TEEs can provide integrity
and confidentiality during execution. TEEs have been
deployed in many forms, including Intel’s SGX-enabled
CPUs [131, 132], Arm’s TrustZone [133]. This execution
model, however, requires the users to send their data to an
enclave running on remote servers which allows the remote
server to have access to the raw data and as the new breaches
in hardware [33, 32, 134, 135, 136, 137] show, the access
can lead to comprised privacy.
5. Conclusion
The surge in the use of machine learning is due to the growth
in data and compute. The data mostly comes from people [5]
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and includes an abundance of sensitive information. This
work tries to provide a comprehensive and systematic
summary of the efforts made to protect privacy of users in
deep learning settings. We find an apparent disparity in the
number of efforts between data aggregation, training, and
inference phases. In particular, little attention has been made
to privacy of the users during inference phase.
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